T

Stéphane Tailland 5ffd0837e1 refactor(mcp): generate the tool definitions from the spec

Produced by k8s-platform/tools/generate-mcp-tools.py: deck file openapi2mcp
does the conversion, and the wrapper re-injects the five things Kong's
generator cannot emit — per-tool ACLs, the MCP behavioural annotations, the
response schemas the plugin uses for structuredOutput, the real upstream host,
and JSON-only request bodies. Each is a documented gap; see
k8s-platform/MCP-TOOL-GENERATION.md.

tools-policy.yaml carries the ACLs and doubles as the allow-list: an operation
becomes a tool only if the policy names it. Kong would otherwise expose every
operation in the spec, DELETE included, and can express no authorization at all
from a bearer-token spec — silently, exit 0, no warning.

Same tools as before, same ACLs. What changed: query parameters are now
declared and callable, each tool carries its response schema so calls return
structured content instead of raw JSON, and request bodies are no longer
tripled across three identical content types.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>

2026-08-29 08:48:42 +02:00

dev

refactor: rename the token-exchange broker to drop the middleware's name

2026-08-29 07:40:10 +02:00

kong

refactor(mcp): generate the tool definitions from the spec

2026-08-29 08:48:42 +02:00

openapi.yaml

Add the OpenAPI spec for the sales domain

2026-08-26 18:28:25 +02:00

README.md

Build sales-api REST + MCP layers (Layer 3), full build in one pass

2026-08-23 17:02:17 +02:00

README.md

sales-api

Kong routing/policy layer for the sales slice of classic-models-api (see /Users/stephanetailland/git/classic-models-api), split out per the DDD decomposition in ../kong-konnect-deployment-strategy.md. The backend stays a single monolith — only Kong does the domain split. Structure mirrors ../payments-api/../customers-api — single MCP route, not ../catalog-api's original two-route pattern (see ../STATUS.md section 18).

Two resources, both with a REST surface and MCP tools:

Order (single key ordernumber) — full CRUD + an order-details sub-resource (GET /sales/v1/orders/{ordernumber}/order-details/, mirrors the backend's own @action on OrderViewSet).
Orderdetail (composite key ordernumber + productcode, exposed as its own top-level resource — the backend does this too, not just nested under Order).

Route	Method	Backend path
`/sales/v1/orders/`	GET, POST	`/classic-models/api/v1/orders/`
`/sales/v1/orders/{ordernumber}/`	GET, PUT, PATCH, DELETE	`/classic-models/api/v1/orders/{ordernumber}/`
`/sales/v1/orders/{ordernumber}/order-details/`	GET	`/classic-models/api/v1/orders/{ordernumber}/order-details/`
`/sales/v1/orderdetails/`	GET, POST	`/classic-models/api/v1/orderdetails/`
`/sales/v1/orderdetails/{ordernumber}/{productcode}/`	GET, PUT, PATCH, DELETE	`/classic-models/api/v1/orderdetails/{ordernumber}/{productcode}/`
`/sales-mcp`	GET, POST, DELETE	MCP streamable-http (tools call into the REST routes above)

Auth & MCP tool ACLs

openid-connect on both surfaces (sales-api REST audience, mcp-sales MCP audience), RFC 8693 exchange chain MCP → sales-api → classic-models-api, same shape as every other domain. IdP: local Keycloak (https://keycloak.sttlab.local/realms/classic-models).

MCP write-tool ACLs (create-order, create-orderdetail) are admin + customer + support — deliberately different from customers-api's/ payments-api's admin-only write tools, because it's what the real backend permission classes actually allow, verified directly against authentication/permissions.py rather than assumed by analogy: OrderPermission.check()/OrderScopedPermission.check() give support an unconditional pass at the class-level (has_permission) check — the "status-only" restriction usually associated with support is enforced at the object level (has_object_permission), which only applies to existing records (update/delete), not create. read_only/ product_manager are excluded (both classes only pass those roles for SAFE_METHODS).

Correction to note: payments-api's create-payment tool (built earlier this session) restricted writes to admin only, described at the time as "verified against PaymentPermission's actual logic" — but PaymentPermission extends this same OrderScopedPermission base class, so by the same reasoning above, customer and support should also have been included there. Not fixed as part of this domain's build (out of scope, and it's more restrictive than the backend rather than less, so not a safety issue) — flagged here and in ../STATUS.md for whoever revisits payments-api's MCP tool ACLs.

Structure

Same dev/ + kong/rest/ + kong/mcp/ layout as payments-api. Deploy key and broker secret follow the same reused/mirrored pattern (catalog-api's deploy key, broker's real secret pulled live from Keycloak and copied to kong-v2/sales-api/* in Vault).