Stéphane Tailland 87d7f7ef44 refactor: rename the token-exchange broker to drop the middleware's name
Every agent has to name this client in the audience scopes it requests, so the
one thing an agent cannot avoid naming was the very thing it should know
nothing about. The gateway is replaceable; the contract should not say
otherwise.

token-exchange-broker, same credential, same behaviour. The old client stays in
the realm until every consumer has moved.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-08-29 07:40:12 +02:00

workforce-api

Kong routing/policy layer for the workforce slice of classic-models-api (see /Users/stephanetailland/git/classic-models-api), split out per the DDD decomposition in ../kong-konnect-deployment-strategy.md. The backend stays a single monolith — only Kong does the domain split. Structure mirrors ../sales-api/../payments-api — single MCP route from the start, not ../catalog-api's original two-route pattern (see ../STATUS.md section 18).

Two resources, both with a REST surface and MCP tools:

  • Office (single key officecode) — full CRUD + an employees sub-resource.
  • Employee (single key employeenumber) — full CRUD + reports (direct reports, self-referential FK) and customers (assigned sales rep's customers) sub-resources.
Route Method Backend path
/workforce/v1/offices/ GET, POST /classic-models/api/v1/offices/
/workforce/v1/offices/{officecode}/ GET, PUT, PATCH, DELETE /classic-models/api/v1/offices/{officecode}/
/workforce/v1/offices/{officecode}/employees/ GET /classic-models/api/v1/offices/{officecode}/employees/
/workforce/v1/employees/ GET, POST /classic-models/api/v1/employees/
/workforce/v1/employees/{employeenumber}/ GET, PUT, PATCH, DELETE /classic-models/api/v1/employees/{employeenumber}/
/workforce/v1/employees/{employeenumber}/reports/ GET /classic-models/api/v1/employees/{employeenumber}/reports/
/workforce/v1/employees/{employeenumber}/customers/ GET /classic-models/api/v1/employees/{employeenumber}/customers/
/workforce-mcp GET, POST, DELETE MCP streamable-http

Auth & MCP tool ACLs — the one domain where customer gets zero access

Both viewsets use ReferenceDataPermission (authentication/permissions.py): read_only/product_manager/support get read access, writes are admin-only, and — unlike every other domain built this session — customer is not in the allow-list at all, not even for reads. Verified directly against the permission class, not assumed: this is genuinely internal staff/organizational data, and the backend enforces that explicitly. All 7 read tools (list-offices, get-office, get-office-employees, list-employees, get-employee, get-employee-reports, get-employee-customers) have ACL [admin, read_only, product_manager, support] — no customer. Both write tools (create-office, create-employee) are admin only.

openid-connect on both surfaces (workforce-api REST audience, mcp-workforce MCP audience), RFC 8693 exchange chain MCP → workforce-api → classic-models-api. IdP: local Keycloak.

Structure

Same dev/ + kong/rest/ + kong/mcp/ layout as sales-api. Deploy key and broker secret reused/mirrored from catalog-api and the live broker client, same pattern as every domain since payments-api.

S
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