Stéphane Tailland
2880e21ef1
16 routes: Office (single key, full CRUD + employees sub-resource) and Employee (single key, full CRUD + reports + customers sub-resources). MCP layer built with the single-route pattern from the start. Only domain where customer role has zero access — verified against ReferenceDataPermission.check(): read_only/product_manager/support get reads, writes are admin-only, customer isn't in the allow-list at all. All 9 MCP tool ACLs reflect this exactly. Keycloak (local): workforce-api-audience + mcp-workforce-audience client scopes, resource clients, broker/librechat attachments. Deploy key and broker secret reused/mirrored, same pattern as every domain since payments-api.
31 lines
692 B
YAML
31 lines
692 B
YAML
apiVersion: configuration.konghq.com/v1
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kind: KongPlugin
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metadata:
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name: ${NAME}-workforce-api-openid-connect
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namespace: ${NAMESPACE}
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plugin: openid-connect
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config:
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issuer: ${OIDC_ISSUER}
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audience_required: ${BACKEND_AUDIENCE}
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auth_methods:
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- bearer
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display_errors: false
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ssl_verify: true
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consumer_claims:
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- - sub
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consumer_by:
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- custom_id
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- username
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consumer_optional: true
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client_id:
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- ${TOKEN_EXCHANGE_CLIENT_ID}
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client_secret:
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- ${TOKEN_EXCHANGE_CLIENT_SECRET}
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token_exchange:
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subject_token_issuers:
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- issuer: ${OIDC_ISSUER}
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conditions: {}
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request:
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audience: ${BACKEND_AUDIENCE}
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scopes: ${BACKEND_SCOPES}
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