Stéphane Tailland
2880e21ef1
16 routes: Office (single key, full CRUD + employees sub-resource) and Employee (single key, full CRUD + reports + customers sub-resources). MCP layer built with the single-route pattern from the start. Only domain where customer role has zero access — verified against ReferenceDataPermission.check(): read_only/product_manager/support get reads, writes are admin-only, customer isn't in the allow-list at all. All 9 MCP tool ACLs reflect this exactly. Keycloak (local): workforce-api-audience + mcp-workforce-audience client scopes, resource clients, broker/librechat attachments. Deploy key and broker secret reused/mirrored, same pattern as every domain since payments-api.
26 lines
644 B
YAML
26 lines
644 B
YAML
apiVersion: external-secrets.io/v1
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kind: ExternalSecret
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metadata:
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name: workforce-api-git-auth
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namespace: workforce
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spec:
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refreshInterval: 1h
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secretStoreRef:
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kind: ClusterSecretStore
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name: vault-kong-v2
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target:
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name: workforce-api-git-auth
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data:
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- secretKey: identity
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remoteRef:
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key: kong-v2/workforce-api/git-deploy-key
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property: identity
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- secretKey: identity.pub
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remoteRef:
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key: kong-v2/workforce-api/git-deploy-key
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property: identity.pub
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- secretKey: known_hosts
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remoteRef:
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key: kong-v2/workforce-api/git-deploy-key
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property: known_hosts
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