The domains' tools: arrays are hand-maintained, and that has now cost two defects an agent found the hard way — create-product could never succeed, and list-products cannot paginate, which let a model answer a product count that looked right and did not come from the data. Five limits measured against decK v1.64.0 and Kong Gateway 3.15, each reproduced rather than read: per-tool ACLs cannot express a consumer-group model and fail silently; the four MCP behavioural annotations are not generated; response schemas are not generated although the plugin consumes them for structuredOutput; servers is taken as the upstream target; every content type is copied and every operation exposed. FastMCP run on the same spec is recorded as a comparison point — it closes three of the five out of the box — with the reason we are not adopting it: it would move per-tool authorization out of the realm and into application code. Also records that MCP Composer and MCP Runner never shipped, so none of this is waiting on an imminent release. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
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MCP tool generation — what Kong does, what it does not, and what we do about it
The five domain gateways expose their REST APIs as MCP servers through the
ai-mcp-proxy plugin. This file records how those tool definitions are produced,
the limits of Kong's generator, and the workarounds each limit forces on us.
It exists because those workarounds are indistinguishable from design choices once they are in the repo. Written down, each one is a measurement of a gap in the product, and each can be deleted the day Kong closes it.
Measured 2026-08-29 against decK v1.64.0, Kong Gateway 3.15, and
catalog-api/openapi.yaml (the catalog domain's spec, extracted from the live
backend). Every claim below was reproduced, not read in documentation.
How the tool definitions are produced today
They are not produced. <domain>-api/kong/mcp/ai-mcp-proxy.yaml carries a
hand-maintained tools: array, committed to git and edited by hand.
The array was almost certainly generated once — every tool's
annotations.title is its OpenAPI summary verbatim, and tool names are
operationId with underscores turned to hyphens, which is exactly what
deck file openapi2mcp produces. It then stopped being regenerated while the
specs kept moving.
That drift is not theoretical. Two defects found on 2026-08-28 and 2026-08-29, both invisible until an agent hit them:
-
create-productcould never succeed. Its schema omittedproductcode, which the API requires. Omit it and the API answers{"productcode":["This field is required."]}; supply it andai-mcp-proxyrejects the call first with Additional properties are not allowed ('productcode' was unexpected). No input worked. -
list-productscannot paginate. The API acceptspageandpage_size; the tool declares no parameters at all. The caller gets the first page, 50 of 110 products, with nothing to say so. An agent asked how many products are in a product line answered 38 — the true figure — while the tool had returned a page containing 22. The number did not come from the data. The dataset is public and the model knows it.This is the worst failure mode for an observable estate: the answer is right, the trace shows a successful tool call, and nothing marks the number as ungrounded.
Kong's generator emits page and page_size correctly. The bug is drift, not
Kong. What follows are the things Kong genuinely does not do.
The generator
deck file openapi2mcp is the only generally available OAS → MCP tool in the
Kong ecosystem, confirmed three ways:
- the
ai-mcp-proxyplugin schema (read from the compiled bytecode in the gateway image) has no spec-ingestion field —parameters,request_bodyandresponsesare per-tool OpenAPI fragments you supply; - the Konnect API returns 404 for every MCP-related path
(
v3/mcp-servers,v2/mcp-servers,v3/mcp,v3/ai,v3/agents,v3/tools,v3/composer,v3/ai-composer,v3/mcp-composer) with a token that returns 200 onv2/control-planes,v3/apisandv3/portals; - MCP Composer and MCP Runner never shipped. Announced for early 2026, the product page that carried the AI Composer now describes Context Mesh, in tech preview, with a registration form and no GA date. MCP Runner is no longer named anywhere. What did land from that roadmap is the MCP Registry — tech preview since February 2026, and a catalogue of existing MCP servers, not a generator.
Caveat on the Konnect probe: the token used belongs to org
b4531006-…, not 2254dc3b-… where the six domains live. Entitlements can
differ per org, so the 404s prove absence from that org, not absence from the
product.
What it gets right, on our spec: operationId → kebab-case tool name matching
our convention, summary → annotations.title, description → description,
path and query parameters (including the pagination we are missing today),
and requestBody with $refs resolved and inlined. Chained through
deck file kong2kic it produces a KongPlugin — the estate's own format.
The limits
1. Per-tool ACLs cannot express our authorization model, and fail silently
Kong generates per-tool ACLs only from an oauth2 security scheme carrying the
x-kong-mcp-acl extension, keyed on OAuth scopes.
Our authorization is realm roles → consumer groups
(consumer_groups_claim: [realm_access, roles]), and our specs declare
ApiKeyAuth and JWTAuth (http bearer). Neither is oauth2, so no ACL is
produced — and no include_consumer_groups either.
Nothing warns. Verified at --verbose 3: no error, no warning, exit 0. A
regeneration would silently publish an MCP server with every operation open to
every caller, create-* and delete-* included.
This is the most dangerous of the five, because the failure is silent and the blast radius is the whole domain.
Note that the plugin supports our model perfectly well — its schema carries
include_consumer_groups, acl_attribute_type, access_token_claim_field,
acl_list_field and default_acl. The gap is in the generator only, and it
matters: the ACL is what makes the estate work. Measured today, pm-user sees
create-product in tools/list and ro-user does not. Kong filters at
discovery, so a read-only user's turn contains no write tool for a prompt
injection to reach.
2. MCP behavioural annotations are not generated
Kong emits annotations.title and nothing else. The MCP specification defines
four more — readOnlyHint, idempotentHint, destructiveHint,
openWorldHint — and all four are mechanically derivable from the HTTP method.
The committed configuration has them; a regeneration would silently drop them.
They are not decoration. An MCP client reads destructiveHint to decide
whether to ask its user before calling a tool.
3. Response schemas are not generated, though the plugin consumes them
The plugin schema documents a per-tool responses field: "This specification
will be used to validate the upstream response and map it back to the
structuredOutput."
So ai-mcp-proxy can validate the backend's response and return structured MCP
output. Our specs contain the responses needed. openapi2mcp does not emit
them, and neither does our hand-written configuration. Every tool therefore
returns raw JSON for the model to interpret, and a backend that changes shape
is caught by nobody.
4. servers is taken as the upstream target
The generated Kong Service points at catalog-dev.sttlab.local:443 — the
gateway's own public hostname, because that is what the spec documents for the
developer portal. Applied as-is, the MCP proxy would loop back into the gateway
instead of reaching the REST service (${REST_HOSTNAME}).
The generator has no notion of documented URL versus upstream target. Any spec written for a portal — which is to say any spec that is also API documentation — hits this.
5. Every content type is copied, and every operation is exposed
DRF declares application/json, application/x-www-form-urlencoded and
multipart/form-data for each write operation. Kong inlines the identical
schema three times. create-product's definition triples in size, for a
payload the plugin will send as JSON. There is no flag to restrict it.
And generation is all-or-nothing: 56 tools across the five domains against the
25 we expose today, PUT, PATCH and DELETE included. x-kong-mcp-exclude
exists but lives in the spec, and our specs are extracted from the live
backend — the exclusions would be overwritten at the next extraction.
The comparison point
FastMCP 3.4.7, run on the same catalog-api/openapi.yaml:
outils exposés: 4 -> ['create_product', 'get_product', 'list_product_lines', 'list_products']
create_product readOnly=False idempotent=False destructive=False outputSchema=oui
get_product readOnly=True idempotent=True destructive=False outputSchema=oui
list_products readOnly=True idempotent=True destructive=False outputSchema=oui
Allow-listing through route_map_fn, the four behavioural annotations through a
six-line mcp_component_fn deriving them from the HTTP method, and output
schemas generated from the OpenAPI responses with no work at all. Limits 2,
3 and 5 do not exist there.
This is a comparison point, not a proposal. FastMCP produces a standalone MCP server, so adopting it would not swap one generator for another — it would take Kong out of the MCP server role and put five new services in its place, moving per-tool authorization from the realm into application code in each of them. That is the one thing the current architecture gets right, and the reason the recommendation below keeps Kong.
What no tool does, Kong and FastMCP alike, is produce decision-shaped tools.
Every generator maps one operation to one tool. An agent asking "can I promise
delivery on 15 March?" wants one tool, not eleven CRUD endpoints to orchestrate.
FastMCP's Tool.from_tool allows composing higher-level tools by hand;
generating them is nobody's feature yet.
Workarounds
In place today
The tools: array is hand-maintained. That is the workaround, and it is
also the cause of both defects above. create-product's schema was repaired by
hand on 2026-08-29 — and the repair itself was wrong: it omitted
quantityinstock from required, because it was written from the Product
response schema instead of ProductRequest. Kong's generator gets that right.
The hand-maintained file is not a stable state; it is a debt accruing silently.
Proposed, not yet built
Keep openapi2mcp as the generator and add one post-processing step that
re-injects what it cannot produce:
| Step | Closes | Source of truth |
|---|---|---|
Inject per-tool acl.allow and include_consumer_groups |
limit 1 | a per-domain policy file, kong/mcp/tools-policy.yaml |
| Derive the four annotations from the HTTP method | limit 2 | the spec's method |
Copy responses into each tool |
limit 3 | the spec |
Rewrite the Service host to ${REST_HOSTNAME} |
limit 4 | the domain's own variables |
Keep application/json only; drop operations absent from the policy |
limit 5 | the policy file |
The policy file doubles as the allow-list: an operation becomes a tool only if the policy grants it an ACL. Adding a tool is then a deliberate act, and the current 25-tool surface is preserved exactly rather than silently tripled.
Each row is a line item against Kong. If a future release generates annotations, that row is deleted and nothing else changes.
Reproducing the measurements
cd <domain>-api
deck file openapi2mcp -s openapi.yaml --no-id -o /tmp/gen.yaml # generate
deck file kong2kic -s /tmp/gen.yaml # to KongPlugin
deck file openapi2mcp -s openapi.yaml --no-id --verbose 3 -o /dev/null | grep -i warn
The plugin's own schema, if the field list is ever in doubt:
POD=$(kubectl -n catalog get pods -o name | grep dataplane | head -1)
kubectl -n catalog exec ${POD#pod/} -- \
cat /usr/local/share/lua/5.1/kong/plugins/ai-mcp-proxy/schema.ljbc > schema.ljbc
LC_ALL=C strings schema.ljbc | LC_ALL=C grep -E '^[a-z][a-z_]{2,30}$' | sort -u