4 Commits

Author SHA1 Message Date
Stéphane Tailland ca0a11fd94 feat(mcp): authorise tool-call parameters, not just the tool name
The ACL answers 'may this identity call create-product'. Nothing answered 'may
it call it with these arguments' — write authorises writing, not this
particular record. And the read cap counts calls, so one call asking for a
hundred thousand rows cost the same as one asking for ten.

The OPA plugin sends the decoded JSON-RPC body, so the decision point sees the
tool name and its arguments. The policy lives once in k8s-platform/opa and every
domain asks the same server.

Enforced at the gateway rather than in an agent, because an agent that has been
talked into something is the case this exists for.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-08-29 18:08:00 +02:00
Stéphane Tailland 2143c5f0bb feat(mcp): cap read volume per caller identity
A scope authorises a read and says nothing about volume. An agent reads a
thousand records in seconds where a person clicks ten, and until now nothing
noticed: the token is valid, the tool is permitted, the ACL passes.

identifier: credential keys the counter on the sub claim — the end user, whoever
is asking on their behalf — so an agent looping under one person's identity
spends that person's budget and cannot spend everyone's. Per-route namespace, so
a busy catalog cannot exhaust another domain's.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-08-29 18:04:14 +02:00
Stéphane Tailland 6fa122207e Capture request/response bodies in audit-log, extend it to MCP
custom_fields_by_lua adds request_body/response_body to the http-log
payload. Bodies and the raw Authorization header are now both logged
in clear text — dev only, flagged in the plugin file itself.
2026-08-21 14:40:20 +02:00
Stéphane Tailland f929a0f7e4 MCP server 2026-08-20 16:26:48 +02:00