26aa89643c
LibreChat served the lab CA's own certificate as its server certificate — a CA:TRUE certificate valid for the whole *.sttlab.local wildcard, from a hand-made tls.yaml that also carried the CA's private key. Gitignored, so never leaked, but the only service in the estate still copying the CA around instead of being issued a leaf. Now a cert-manager Certificate for librechat.sttlab.local: CA:FALSE, one dnsNames, key generated in the cluster and rotated there. The two uses of that Secret had to be separated first, which is the part worth knowing: sttlab-tls was both the ingress certificate and the CA bundle mounted as NODE_EXTRA_CA_CERTS for outbound calls. Replacing it with a leaf alone would have left LibreChat unable to verify Keycloak. The CA certificate now comes from ca-configmap.yaml — the certificate, never the key, committed like the agents'. Verified: the ingress serves CA:FALSE with SAN librechat.sttlab.local, the pod's outbound call to Keycloak returns 200 with TLS verified, and the old secret is deleted. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
22 lines
714 B
YAML
22 lines
714 B
YAML
# cert-manager issues this into the `librechat-tls` Secret.
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#
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# It replaces a hand-made `tls.yaml` that carried the lab CA's own certificate
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# and private key, which LibreChat then served as its server certificate — a
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# CA:TRUE certificate valid for the whole `*.sttlab.local` wildcard, where a
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# leaf for one name is what a server needs.
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#
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# The key is generated in the cluster, rotated by cert-manager, and never
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# reaches a file anyone has to remember not to commit.
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apiVersion: cert-manager.io/v1
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kind: Certificate
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metadata:
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name: librechat-tls
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namespace: librechat
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spec:
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secretName: librechat-tls
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dnsNames:
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- librechat.sttlab.local
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issuerRef:
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name: sttlab-local-ca
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kind: ClusterIssuer
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