Stéphane Tailland
2bb6faa121
Withdrawn: the offline_access mandate built an hour ago. An agent running on its own account acts for itself. Nobody asked for the 06:00 run, so naming a person as its principal was a fiction — and choosing which person was arbitrary, as the first implementation showed by picking whichever test user was to hand. It also cost more than it was worth. An offline token has no exp, dies only after 30 days unused, is not rotated on use, and is revocable only by killing that user's offline session: a permanent bearer credential standing in for a consent nobody gave. Now client_credentials, with the service account carrying read_only — the least privilege the job needs. That is not a convention the workflow observes: the MCP server maps the role to a consumer group at discovery, so tools/list under this identity returns get-product and list-products and nothing else. create-product is invisible rather than merely unused. Nothing downstream changes. azp still names the agent, audiences are still per-server, and policy still reads roles — a service account has roles like anyone else. The mandate client stays in the realm, unused, for the case where a person's own authority genuinely is in play: Recouvrement's dunning, which is human-validated already. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
46 lines
1.5 KiB
YAML
46 lines
1.5 KiB
YAML
# This estate's n8n: the template from infra-n8n, with our values.
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#
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# Everything specific lives here rather than in that repo, so the same template
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# deploys somebody else's n8n without carrying ours.
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apiVersion: kustomize.toolkit.fluxcd.io/v1
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kind: Kustomization
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metadata:
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name: n8n
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namespace: n8n
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spec:
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interval: 10m
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sourceRef:
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kind: GitRepository
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name: infra-n8n
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path: ./k8s
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prune: true
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wait: true
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timeout: 5m
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postBuild:
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substitute:
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NAMESPACE: n8n
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N8N_HOSTNAME: n8n.sttlab.local
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N8N_IMAGE: docker.n8n.io/n8nio/n8n:2.37.4
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POSTGRES_IMAGE: postgres:16.10-alpine
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N8N_STORAGE: 2Gi
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POSTGRES_STORAGE: 5Gi
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TIMEZONE: Europe/Paris
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INGRESS_CLASS: nginx
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INGRESS_BODY_SIZE: "50m"
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TLS_ISSUER_NAME: sttlab-local-ca
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TLS_ISSUER_KIND: ClusterIssuer
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VAULT_SERVER: https://vault.sttlab.eu
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VAULT_MOUNT: secrets
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VAULT_SECRET_PATH: n8n/instance
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VAULT_STORE_NAME: vault-n8n
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VAULT_APPROLE_SECRET: vault-approle-n8n
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# The agents' Keycloak client secrets, so a workflow can exchange tokens
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# as the agent it represents. Created by agent-secrets.yaml beside this.
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EXTRA_ENV_SECRET: n8n-agent-secrets
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EXTRA_CA_CONFIGMAP: sttlab-ca
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# "false" so a workflow can read $env.<AGENT>_CLIENT_SECRET. It means any
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# workflow on this instance can read any variable in the pod — acceptable
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# while it runs only this estate's agents, and not a moment longer.
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BLOCK_ENV_ACCESS: "false"
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EXECUTIONS_MAX_AGE_HOURS: "336"
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