refactor: an autonomous run is a machine identity, not a mandate
Withdrawn: the offline_access mandate built an hour ago. An agent running on its own account acts for itself. Nobody asked for the 06:00 run, so naming a person as its principal was a fiction — and choosing which person was arbitrary, as the first implementation showed by picking whichever test user was to hand. It also cost more than it was worth. An offline token has no exp, dies only after 30 days unused, is not rotated on use, and is revocable only by killing that user's offline session: a permanent bearer credential standing in for a consent nobody gave. Now client_credentials, with the service account carrying read_only — the least privilege the job needs. That is not a convention the workflow observes: the MCP server maps the role to a consumer group at discovery, so tools/list under this identity returns get-product and list-products and nothing else. create-product is invisible rather than merely unused. Nothing downstream changes. azp still names the agent, audiences are still per-server, and policy still reads roles — a service account has roles like anyone else. The mandate client stays in the realm, unused, for the case where a person's own authority genuinely is in play: Recouvrement's dunning, which is human-validated already. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
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@@ -83,16 +83,40 @@ webhook, and token verification lands where it already lives. No new component.
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Alternative: a small FastA2A adapter, written once for both — see
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`classic-models-agent-catalogue`, which uses FastA2A already.
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## The autonomous mandate
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## An autonomous run is a machine identity
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No user session exists when these run, so authority must be pre-established: the
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user obtains `offline_access` when creating the mandate, the refresh token is
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stored encrypted, and the exchange happens at trigger time. `sub` stays the user
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who mandated, `azp` says which agent acted.
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**Superseded, 2026-08-29.** An earlier revision had these agents act under an
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`offline_access` mandate: a user authorises the agent, their refresh token is
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stored encrypted, and it is redeemed at trigger time so `sub` stays the person
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who mandated.
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The MCP servers see no difference between an autonomous and a conversational
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call — same `sub`, same `azp`, same audiences. That is deliberate: downstream
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policy must not need to know the trigger mode.
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That was built and then withdrawn, because it is not true. **An agent running on
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its own account acts for itself.** Nobody asked for the 06:00 run; naming a
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person as its principal is a fiction, and choosing which person is arbitrary —
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the first implementation picked whichever test user was to hand.
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It also cost more than it was worth. An offline token has no `exp`; it dies only
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after 30 days unused, is not rotated on use (`revokeRefreshToken: false`), and
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is revocable only by killing that user's offline session. A permanent bearer
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credential, standing in for a consent nobody gave.
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So: `client_credentials`, and the service account carries the realm role the job
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needs. For the periodic reorder run that is **`read_only`** — so `create-product`
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is not merely unused, it is **invisible** to that identity. Least privilege
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enforced by the realm and the gateway rather than by the workflow behaving
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itself. Verified: `tools/list` under the machine identity returns `get-product`
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and `list-products`, nothing more.
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What does *not* change: `azp` still names the agent, the audiences are still
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per-server, and the MCP server still derives the consumer group from the token's
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roles. Downstream policy still needs no knowledge of the trigger mode — it reads
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roles, and a service account has roles like anyone else.
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**Where a mandate would still be right:** when a person's own authority is
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genuinely in play — an action they are accountable for, or data scoped to them.
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Recouvrement's dunning is the candidate, and it is a human-validated step
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already. The `classic-models-mandate` client is left in the realm, unused, for
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that case.
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## Backlog
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